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Introduction: The Crisis and the Challenge
As the 1990s unfolded, citizens of the international community seemed destined to bid farewell to a turbulent twentieth century with a ce lebrat ion of the end of the European cold war, the global spread of market democracies in its wake, and the buoyant prosperity and expanding freedoms they brought. Instead, the century closed with the globa l comm unity engu lfed in an unprecedentedly severe financial crisis that devastated many of the wor ld ' s most rapidly growing economies, threatened the world 's most mature and powerful countries. and called into question the mechanism and very model of a globalised international economy a nd community. The floating of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997 catalysed a contagious sequence of financial meltdowns. Over the subsequent year these devastated not on ly Thailand but also Indonesia, the world 's fourth most populous country, and Organisation for Econom ic Co-operation and Devel opment (OECD) member South Korea, imperiled such traditional bastion of stable growth as Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the People' Republic of China, and helped plunge the world 's second largest economy, Japan, into deeper recession . On 17 August 1997, the crisis spread to Europe. when. three weeks after the latest infusion of financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of Eight (G8)'s newest member Russia was forced to devalue its currency and default on its loans. Within a month . the globa l panic unleashed by the Ru sian default battered other G8 countries sllch as Ca nada. and threatened to paralyse the financial system of the world 's most powerful and superb ly performing economy, the United tates . As 1998 moved into 1999 it was the America's wh ich were afflicted. as Brazil faced a major run on its reserves and a sharp recession as a result. As Group of Seven (G7) and G8 leaders gathered in Cologne, Germany, in June 1999 tor their 25'h annual -I Shaping a New Imel'l7ational Financial System ummit, a preca ri o u ca lm preva il ed, a ltho ugh strai ns in Argentin a, and later South Korea, ke pt everyo ne in a state of ne rvo us vig ilance. T he foc us had hi fted fro m th e mirac le to the me ltdown of emerg in g eco no mi e in A ia a nd e lsewhe re, fro m th e magic to th e ma ni a of the marketplace, fro m acco lades to a nx ieties about g loba li sati o n, a nd from the vigour to the vulne rab ility of th e leadin g industri a l democrac ies and the intern ati o nal in stituti ons they had constructed to govern g loba l fin ance.
The G7 countries the mse lves escaped, ifby the nan'owe t of marg in s, the most devastating effects of th e cri s is. But fo r the ma ny countri es who did not, , the destructi o n it bro ught surpassed that of th e great de press io n of the 193 0s.
Moreover, the speed with whi ch it s pread, the broad scope of the countri e it we pt up in its gras p, and the w ide number of indi vidua ls w ithin th e m whose life prospects were destroyed, gave it a unique characte r. T he failure of the wo rld 's leading natio nal authorities, internatio na l. in stituti o ns, o r market acto rs to foresee its o utbreak, predict its course, o r confide ntl y contain its c umulati ve devastation re inforce d the co ll ecti ve rea l isati o n that the intern ati o na l fin a nc ia l economy of the twen' ty-first century was very di ffe rent in kind tha n that whi ch had proceed ed it. T he cri s is a lso made obv ious that, in a n interd e pendent wor ld economy, more than mere o penn ess to fo re ig n capita l and a free in vestme nt clim ate was necessary to g uara ntee a stable evo lutio n, but that man y conditio ns for the deve lopment of market econo m ies in the developed wo rld , whi ch had been v ita l but gene ra ll y overlooked. were of equa l impo rtance, such as th e rule of law, regulati o ns concernin g the re li a bili ty of balance sheets, bankruptcy law, or rul es fo rbiddin g corrupti on. It further bred a convict io n that a fundamentally new arc hitecture for its inte rn ational govern ance had to be constru cted if an o pe n inte rn ati o na l fin anc ia l syste m was to continue, and be contro ll ed in ways that benefited a ll.
T he c halle nge of creating that new a rchitecture unleashed a seri es of inte nse debates over several fundamental and interre lated questio ns. Wh at was th e rea l cause of the As ian financ ial cris is and the contag io n w hi c h bro ug ht it w ith such fo rce to most reg ions of the world , and to many, but not a ll , of the countries w ithin them ? How best could the c ris is be conta ined a nd who sho uld take the lead, and bea r the burden , in so doing? Was there a trul y g lo ba l ised rather than regio na l ised inte rnational econo my. and to what degree a nd in what ways was it different than th at which had proceeded it? Was a new a rc hitecture required to govern it, o r mere ly a et of improve ments and additi ons for the plumbing a nd the metres that regul ated and mo nito red it? What principles and processes should guide th e renovatio n effort, and w hat new procedures and mechanisms hould be put in place? And who, w ithin COl1lrih llfiol1.\· and ('htlilenges 5 international institutions, national governm ents, privare mark ets. civi I soc iety. and citizens of an ever more connected global community. shoul d guide and govern the emerg ing market sy tem ' ?
These debates st ill rage in intell ectual ircles. But long betore they will have come to command a consensus, indeed from the very ea rl y stages of the crisis, leaders of the international com munity equipped with onl y tentative answers and fragile confidence have been forced to confro nt the crisis and begin constructing an architecture that co uld cope with ir, conta in it. and vastl y reduce the chances that it would return . In doing so they had to in ve nt and institute a structure that wo uld meet the needs of an in creas in gly globali sed financial system and th e a piration of those throughout th e world we ll beyond the financial community who were so pro to undl y affected by it. It was an effort that mob ili sed the energies and enthu siasm of many. But at th e very centre of the effort we re the deliberations, debates,. clirections. and dec isions of the Group of Seven lead ing industri al democracies.
The Approach
This book ex plores the eff0l1 to contain the global financial cri s is that erupted in 1997, to construct a new internati onal financial system in its wake, and fo rmali se the role in this process of the G7, it international in stitutional co ll eagues and co mpetitors, and its member governments and tinancial co mmunities. It embraces a ll of the fundamental question s unl eashed by the crisis that still dominate analytical and policy debates. Yet its tocu s is on how well the cris is response and reconstruction 'effort. importantl y shaped and guided by the G7, has proceeded as the new century beg in s.
This collection thus has three central purposes. First and toremost, it criti ca lly assesses efforts thus far to co nstruct a new. strengthened international financial system to meet the needs of the globa l economy and community in the rapidly global ising wo rld of the twenty-first century. Second Iy, it chall enges core elements of the .ep istem ic consensus underl yi ng thi s effort by subjecting the premi ses and principles of the emerging ed iti cc to a hard analysis of their economic logic, market impact. and political feasibi lity. Thirdly, it offers suggestions about which direction s 1'0 avo id. and which to pursue as the proj ect to construct a strengthened internati onal fin anci al system moves into the decisive tinal stages required tor its completion .
To meet these objectives, thi s collection assembles the analyses ofl eading experts from th e scho larly and po l icy world . It embraces the talents of those within government, private sector finance, and the academic/resea rch community. Its analysis is firml y grounded in the economics of internatio nal finance, and supplemented by the ins ights of political sc ience and management studies. It includes experts from Europe, North America and Asia, and from all G7 member countries, as well as a v iew from the world o utside. In many cases the insights of these authors have been shaped by their direct experience. in the past or present, in shaping a nd manag ing the j international financial system. But in all cases they bring to bear o utstandin g academic and analytic credentials and the critical di stance that tl ows from them .
No effort has been made to impose a common analytical o r interpretive framework to g uide these contributions. Each has \2een guided by the dual discipline of focussing on fundamental issues in the effort to shape a strengthened financial system , and to do so in a critical spirit guided by an independent analysis of underlying premises and processes . As a result, thi s collection reflects the diversity of the debate and points to new directions for advance, as each author addresses the core issues from a distinctive vantage point.
The Core Issues
Taken together, these analyses address the five core issues at the heart of th e contemporary debate over shaping a strengthened international financial system . These deal with why the crisis came, how well the existing system responded, what more is needed now, which sector sho uld bear the burden, and who should take the lead .
The first concerns the causes of the crisis and contagion and whethe r it has now bee n finally contained. How different was it from pa nics, mani as. and depress ions past? With the ins ig hts generated by the Mex ica n pe 0 deva luation of December 20. 1994, the collapse of Barin gs Bank in th e sprin g of 1995 . a nd the focus of the G7 o n internatio na l financial system reform at their 1995 Ha lifax Summit, could it have been anticipated and prevented? Was the crisis fundamentally the result of a collection of po licy and institutional defects with in particu lar countries, if at broadly s im i lar stages of development, or was the crisis essentially driven by the dynam ics of a newl y globalised international system and the inadequacies of the principles.
COn/rihlllions and Challenge.l· 7 procedures, and institutio ns for its governance? Has e no ugh n o \~ bcen done to contain and conclude the c ri s is. or is· there mere ly a c urrent respi te until it resumes in its next stage?
The second core issue, flowing directly from the first, is how a nd how well the international community has coped with the challenges o r crisi s response and system strengthening thus far. Is the challenge one of calling for incremental reform, deeper reconstruction. or historic replacement with a very new system of principles practices, processes, and set of institutio ns? Whether the challenge be one of architecture or plumbing, is the project proceeding quickly enough? And is it unfolding in the correct direction. with an overall coherence and adequate allowance for experimentation. and subsequent m idcourse correction?
The third core iss ue focusses on the particular critical defects of the o ld system and the best design for the new mechanisms to be added in respo nse. What is the best weighting and mix of mechanism s for transparency. surveillance, precautionary lending, and international standstill or bankrupt€y procedures? What are the best forms, procedures, and equence of introduction and lise for each? Is it necessary to move into broader domains. such as control of international financial and capital flows, greater exchange rate management, fixity, or even currency unification. and the rul es for internationalliberalisation or foreign direct investment? How does o ne g uard against consequences such as moral hazard?
The fourth issue is the relative respons ibility and ro le -pa. t and prospective, positive and no rmati ve -of internatio nal in stitution s. nati o nal governments. and private sector market players in the design and operation of the new system . How much and how should the principle of pri vate sector burden sharing be instituted? What volume and form of additional public sector resources are required and where should they come fro m and be controlled? And what place do other civil soc iety actors and th e ir concern have in the new architecture?
The fifth issue is the past, present, and prospective role of the G7, its governments, the financial community and citizens. in prov iding leadership and guidance in the construction and governa nce of the new system . Is it the United States alone or the G7 as a co llective that has been. and re mai ns the necessa ry centre of leadership and guidance? What ha been the ro le. and what role should broader processes such as tlie new Group of 22 (G22) practi ca l fo rmula fo r in vo lving those o uts ide th e ex istin g centres of intern ati onal fin a nc ia l govern ance, so th at th e necessary ex perti se. leg itim acy. surve i Ila nce, a nd sa ncti o ns ca n be sec ured?
The Analyses
To address these core iss ues. it is necessary to explo re in turn ea rl ier effo rts to shape a nd strengthen the intern ati o na l fin a nc ia l syste m. the actua l c ri ses o f , 1997-99, the spec ific issues at th e hea rt of current effOlt to construct a new syste m, and the broader array of iss ues c lose ly re lated to th e proces . T hu , Part I conside rs past successes and fa i lures thro ug h the curre nt cri s is. fro m its o ri g ins in As ia, through its impact on emerg ing and G7 econo mi es aro und th e wo rld , and the respo nse of th e G7 a nd its membi!rs at conta inm ent and contro l.
C hapter 2 beg in s w ith a n a na lys is of efforts durin g th e past qua rte r century to reform the internati o na l fi na nc ia l syste m. and th e ro le of the G7 in thi s enterpri se. In exa mining "T he G7 Summit ' s Contributio n: Past. Present, and Prospecti ve". Ni cho las Bay ne ide nti fies fo ur earli e r definin g mome nts w hen the wo rld , and the G7, confro nted as a centra l cha ll enge the tas k of a lte rin g in bas ic ways a fi nanc ia l system unde r severe stress. T he fi rst was the cris is over the g lo ba l exchange rate regi me th at served as ve ry ra i.l'ol7 d 'eIr e fo r the birth of the G7 sUll1mit as an economic institutio n -th e breakdown of the Bretton Woods syste m of fixed exc hange rates in 1971. th e fa ilure of the IM F and ex istin g processes to construct a dura ble, w ide ly acce pted a ltern ati ve, a nd th e dec is ion of the fi rst Summit at Ra mbouill et, France in 1975 to institute a new syste m of managed fl oating. T he second was the commerc ia l bank de bt cris is prec ipitated by Mex ico ' s de./clclo defa ult at th e 1M F meetin gs in To ro nto in 1982. a nd th e wo rk of G7 ull1m its fro m Ve rsa ill es in 1982 to Pa ri s in 1989 to arri ve ti nal ly, in th e fo rm of the Brady Pl an, at a so lutio n. T he third epi sode, de bt re li ef fo r th e wo rl d ' s poorest co untries, began w ith the "Toronto term s" fo r re lief at the 1998 Summit and continued thro ug h to the Co logne de bt initiat ive of 1999. T he fi na l quest fo r the G7 has been its effort to cope with specul ati ve fi na nc ia l crises. startin g at Ha li fax in 1995 and continuin g to the present day .
From thi s ana lys is tl ow five conc lu s io ns. T he tirst is th e unique o ppo rtuni ty th e Summit o ffers G7 leade rs to reso lve issues that have detied so luti o n at lower leve l . T he second is the need fo r adva nce prepa rat io n so leaders can use th e ir tim e most effective ly. whil e the third is the need to keep
up th e hi gh leve l pressure until commitments are fo rged a nd implemented . The fourth is th e need to move beyond the info rm a l leade rship or th e (j7 tll integrate the new arrangements into formal o rga ni sati ons and give them lega l force. The fifth is the indi spensabl e need for the G7 to lead. but a lso throug h the ir own example. exp lanation, and sensiti vity to the des ires of o uts ide rs. to secure a broader acceptance for the ir actions.
In C hapter 3, "The Asian C ri s is and its Implications". Takashi Kiuc hi looks. from a Japanese perspective, at th e o ri g ins and cau es of the A ian tinancial crisis. Japan ' s interpretatio n of and respon se to the c ri s is. and th e lessons that can be appl ied to the task of rebu i Iding the inte rn atio na I tina nc ia I a rchitecture. He locates th e ultim ate causes of the cris is in capi ta l acco unt rather than current acco unt probl ems. I iq uid ity rather than ' o lve ncy pro blem s. and th e he rding be havi our of investors. but notes a lso how po liti c ia ns overriding th e ir offic ia ls and regulators compo unded th e problem . .Iapa n·s re ponse came initia ll y in th e form o f a proposa l to r an As ian mo neta ry fund that was abandoned in th e face orus o ppos iti o n. th en with a "New M iyazawa Initiative" of US$30 billion worth o f bilateral le nding g uarantees. pro posa ls to reform the IM F. and new measures to make th e ye n a n internati o nal currency. The major lessons orthe cri s is. Kiu c hi concludes. are th e need to r dec isive action at early stages. for e nh ancin g the I MF s a utho rity to dea l w ith capital account problem s. and closer regional po l icy co-ordinati o n. beginn ing w ith macroecono mic po licy and the development of an As ia n bo nd market to replace short-term borrowing from di stant bankers. Kiuch i ' s a nal ys is leads him to c lear conclus io ns o n many of the key issues in the debate over a new architecture. He rejects dollarisation as a so luti o n lo r sma ll er Asian economies, but approves of sho rt terms ca pital restri ct ions as a tran s itio nal measure. mandatory private sector burden harin g. and state bankruptcy codes. He ca ll s for universa l guide l ines and processes lo r accounting, disclosure. bankruptcy. and tinancial superv is ion. But heca ll s tor a staged approach to introduce these new mea ure . ti g htl y ta il o red to the particular s ituation of each country, w ith proper macroecono mic policy re info rc ing improved international regul at io l) . Aboveall. he identities th e rol e o f the G7 in mov in g toward a dell/C/O target zone mechani m. and points to the benefits that further moves in this directi o n co uld brin g.
In ha pter 4. ''The G7. I ntern ati ona l Fina nce. and Deve lo pin g Countries". Duncan Wood analyses th e wo rk o f th e G7 ill o perating and re lo rming the international financial syste m from the per pective o f tht: devdop ill g countries. in particular, that of th e ten large emerging market econo m ies . The c hapter first explores the record of th e G7 during the decade from th e late 1980s to the late 1990s, identi fy in g how the developing countries have bee n affected by G7 initiati ves in mac roeconomic co-ordin ation. debt renegotiation and reduction , and internat iona l financial sy tem reform . It then focusses on the main ach ievements of the 1999 Co logne Summ it that affect developing countries, notably the Co logne debt initiati ve, broadening the membership of the Financial Stability Forum , and the increased impOJ1ance accorded to the IMF Interim Committee, now renamed the International Financ ial and Monetary Committee. Wood a lso examines why and how the G7 mi ght move toward a more meaningfu l dialogue with , and inclusion of, the major ,emerging economies, in the interest of improv ing the effectiveness and leg itimacy of the intern ational financial system be ing shaped to govern the g lobal econom y of the future.
Wood 's co nc lusions are critical yet constructive. He .iudges that the G 7 in the past has inadeq uate ly incorporated the views of developing cou ntrie as it has dealt with the issues that directly concern tl;em. While the Co logne Summit brought some improvement, its advances remain inadequate to the need to involve the large emerg ing economi es as they ri se in re lati ve power, and" as their economic performance becomes ever more consequential to that of the G7 countries themselves. The clear need is to dev i e better proce ses for regular, formali sed G7-emerging economy dialogue and consultation, based in part on the mode ls that other international institutions have recently evo lved.
In C hapter 5, "The Dynami cs ofG7 Leadership in Cri sis Response and System Reconstructi on " John 1. Kirton exp lores the ro le of the G7, and of the lesser members within it, in responding to the crisis and constructi ng a new international tinancial archi tecture. He traces the dipl omacy of and within the G7 through the three phases of the Asian crisis of 1997-98, the g loba l cris is of 1998 and the reconstructi on effort culm inatin g at the o logne Summit in June 1999. In doing so he hi ghlights how it was the G7 co ll ect ive ly that ultimate ly prevailed, rather than the US a lone, the IMF as a broad multilatera l organisation loc ked in a neo-l ibera l mode l. or pri vate sector markets and multinational corporati ons. FUJ1her affi rming the leadership of the G7 co llective ly, rather than as a support group for American leadership. Kirton demonstrates how Canada and Britain, the least powerful member. were ab le to provide effective intellectual , policy, and tructural leadership by advanc ing distinctive positions, combinin g with other members. and persisting to see their principles and positions preva il in the end .
Kirton' s analys is chall enges the traditional theories of why and how effective G7 co-operation has been achieved . In contrast to theories based on (·Onlrihlllion.l' and (·ha llenge.l' I I the indispensable element of an American willingness and ability to lead . hc shows how the G7 came together at the initiative of other members in the face of a reluctant America deterred and immobilised at first by Congre s ional opposition to authorising the US share of a quota increase for the IMF. and in September 1998 by panicking market players on the verge of freezing its domestic credit system. Nor of great relevance in inducing collective G7 action were common lessons from the distant past, a false new consensu about the impotence of governments in the face of powerful markets and private capital flows, transnational coal itions involving sub-governmental and societal actors, or traditional differences between G7 members. Rather. the autonomous power of international institutions was evident as Canada and Britain were able to use their prerogatives and legacy as G7 hosts. and the G7 norms of consensus decision making to take and s ustain a leaders hip role. Most importantly, it was the particular character of the G7 as a modern international concert, in the face ofa systemic crisis, that allowed the smaller members to lead the G7, and the G7 to lead the international community with success.
Part II moves from the crisis, its consequences. and its containment to the particular core issues that dominated the debate over the principles and procedures on which a new international financial system should be based . I n Chapter 6, " Transparentising the Global Money Busine s: G lasnost o r Just Another Wild Card in Play?", George M. von Furstenberg explores the different meanings of the now highly fashionable concept of "transparency". Noting that greater transparency always involves a redistributi o n of power. he distinguishes between statistical transparency and political transparency, o r glasnost, and highlights how both were evident in abundance in the decision s of financial system reform at the Cologne Summit.
Given the many forms of uncertainty that exist in econom ic analysis, and the capacity of both "offensive" and "defensive" players to benefit from more information , von Furstenberg calls for greater skepticism o n the part of policymakers and commentators about the progress to be made by securin g greater statistical transparency alone. Indeed. he notes. a denial of data had little to do with the outbreak of recent financial crises in developing econom ies. and he judges that the greater transparency currently e nvisaged by the G7 will do very little to reduce the risk of future tinancial crises. He does. however, judge political transparency to be important. if it is linked to a comprehensive program of reform, while hi ghlighting how it is the rich players in the rich countries who are likely to benefit the most.
In Chapter 7, "G lobal Cap ital Flows: Maximi ing Benetits. Minimising Ri sks". Joseph P. Daniels exa mines policy responses of the G7 in li ght of the perce ived benefits and probl em of liberali ed ca pital markets. He tirst expl ai ns the eco nomi c benefits of liberali sed financial mark ets and high quality interm edi aries. ext he con iders the probl ems th at pervade tinancial markets and the constraints that capital mobility places on macroeco nomi c po li cy. Additionally the role offore ign specul ators in the East Asian cri ses is considered.
Given the preceding arguments, Daniels co nsiders th e proposal put • forward in the G7 Finance Ministers' Strengthening the !lIternatirmo! Financial Architecture: Report of the (i 7 Finance Min ister.l· to the Kii!11 Economic Summit. He fi nds that many recomm endat ions su pport the pri nc i p Ie of minimal market interference and avo id crea ting additional ri sk or dimini shing country credibility. Unfortunately, he also I' inds th at the G7 has offered little to the likely ca ndidates offuture tlnancialmeltdowns. the larger deve loping nations at an intermediate stage of financial development. Hence. he co ncurs with the general view of Duncan Wood in Chapter 4. Dani els concludes by suggest ing a set of re ponsibilities for the G7 in th e reform process. In Chapter 8, "The ew Financial Architecture forthe Globa l Economy'·. orbert Walter take up the debate over tran parency. and over several othe r central issues. notably the new Financial Stability Forum. equity rati o for fin ancial in stituti ons. supervi ion. and th e broader questions surroundin g Russ ia and the internati onal trade system. Dec laring that little has been done to reform the system to cope with another finan cial cri s is that is sure to come. he casts doubt of the adequacy of the GTs emphasis on surve illance and th e re pon ibility of each co untry to maintain a sound eco nomic po licy. U eful advances such as the Financial tability Forum and improved eq uity ratios for financial in stitutions still require f urther work on the important detail s. Additionally, calls for greater tran sparency and surveillance suffer from th e fact that in a wo rld of " Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" . the resultin g systems will be ba ed on American models that other G7 governments, such as Germany. will resist. _ More important. in Walter' view. is the fact that two fundam ental issues have yet to be sati sfactoril y addressed. The lirst i the need to r a mec hani sm to allow bankruptcy to take place in the tlnancial sector. The second is for G7 governments to stop the reca pitalisation or excess ive capitali sation o f ailing financial in stitutions. ('lIl1frihlllioll.l' (lnd ( '/1III/cnge.l 
In C ha pter 9, " The Ro le of the Internati o nal Monetary Fun d as Lend er or Last Resort" , C urz io G iannini exa mines how a lende r of last re o rt ca n deal w ith financial instabili ty at the nati o na l leve l and \' hether th e conccpt of a n inte rnatio nall ender of last re o rt makes e n e in today'sglobalise I econo my . At the nati onal leve l, he notes, th e mo neta ry framework a nd he nce th e lende r of last resort functio n has now become very di ffe rent from th ose s pec ifi ed in th e c lassic model, as independent central banks ha ve a ri sen to practice " illuminated di scretio n" in pursuit ofa tab ility-ori e nted mo netary policy. At th e inte rnatio na l leve L while th e founders o f th e Bretton Wood yste m kept the lender of last resort function at the natio nal level, the question is now what ca n be done as a lender of last resort in a g lo bal env ironm ent.
Gianninni's conclus io n is that ve ry littl e can be do ne, as a ny g ra nd des ig n to transfer the lende r of last resort function to th e internatio na l Ie e l sho uld be regard ed w ith us pic io n. Indeed. the IM F is already movi ng in the othe r direction. by providing c redibility so otherwi se tinancially frozen cou ntri es ca n bo rrow for pri vate ca pital mark ets, by le nding into a rrea rs. and by invo lv ing pri va te c redito rs thro ugh info rmal means in th e Ko rea n rescue pac kage. G inannini thus approves of the creation of contingent c red it lines. and further m oves to make creditors mo re sensi ti ve to the risks th ey ta ke. through ei ther improved wo rld wide regul atio n and supe rv isio n or debt mo ratorium s w ith negotiated restructuring, The new Fina ncia l Stab ilit Forum , with its emphasis on th e fo rm er. faces a daunting task . But its very creati o n and earl y e mphas is suggest that th e IMF s ho uld refi ne its ro le ora provider of c redibility, suppo rt mooth e r workout procedure. a nd avo id thinking of itse lf as a world centra l bank.
Part III moves from the debate over core financia l questions to the broader iss ues c lose ly re lated to th em and ones w ho e treatm ent co uld we ll afrect th e partic ular measures se lected and the success of th e ir use.
In C hapte r 10, "' Practi s ing Exchange Rate Flex ibility" . li v ie r Davanne a nd Pierre Jacquet examine the question. now at the centre o r th e debate. of' the appropriate exchange rate regimes for e me rg ing and deve loped econo m ies. and of the best international mechani sm for ensuring the needed tability in the face of ever-threatening vo latili ty, mi sa li gnment. a nd some tim es brutal hifts from an undul y fix ed to a free floating reg im e, They o utline th e c urre nt consensus regarding th e dangers of fixed exc han ge rates lo r e me rging econo mies, a nd the costs of th e a lternati ve, forcibly adopted by man y in the wake of th e 1997-99 fin a nc ia l cri s is. of freely tl oatin g reg im es . They th cn exa mine the advantages ora managed fl oatin g regim e. and th e ro le th e G7 and IM F play mi ght play in effective ly manag in g it.
Through their deta iled eco nomic and institutional. th eoretica l and empirica l analys is, Jacquet and Dava nne make a powerful argu ment that the current consensus needs to be rethought. Both econom ic rational ity and the record of past decades show that exchange rate fl ex ibility is necessary, and that hi ghl y fi xed exchange rate regim es should be relied upon onl y excepti onally. Yet there is a broader array of avai lable options, within which stands out an "adjustable reference parity" reg im e. I n managing such a reg im e, the G7 and IMF, wo rking in tandem. can do much to strengthen monitoring and surve illance, and thus contribute substantially to exc hange • rate stability.
In hapter I I. "Can Small Countri es Keep Their Own Money and Floating Exchange Rates?" . Geo rge M. von Furstenberg looks inward at a central issue of fin ance -that of exchange rates -and outwa rd from the G7 at the sma ll er countries in the system. He as ks in p~rt ic ul a r what choice of exchange rate reg im es ex ist for sma ll countries that have full y opened up to internati ona l capital markets and free trade in finan cial services when they are located in the vicinity of a large country or group of countries whose currency is in wide international use. With G7 Finance Mini sters in the lead up to Co logne ad vising th at such coun tries' should genera lly not defe nd fixed exchange rates with borrowed money, and with most co untries save fo r Chin a hav in g lifted traditional ca pital contro ls. the options fo r such countries reduce to fl oating exchange rates, currency boards, and monetary uni ons.
Von Furstenberg concludes th at the first two of these optio ns. fo r small and medium-sized count ries with low credibility currencies. brin gs major probl ems of currency substi tuti on and incompl ete hedging, to the point where policy makers are dri ven to look at monetary uni on as a sa te haven. Monetary uni on ca n take the form of unil aterally adopting as lega l tender the stro ng international currency of a nea rby country, or the multilateral Euroland ro ute of deep fin ancial integration on the basis of equality. The trend is thus towa rd reg ional currency conso l idation, the disappea rance of many lesser currencies. and the separate exchange rates and nati onal monetary poli cies th"t accompany them.
Fi nally, in Chapter 12. " From Globa li sati on to Reg ionalism: The Foreign Direct Investment Dimension oflntemational Finance", Alan M. Rugman broadens the focus from the activities of short-term investors in financial capital to the long-term toreign direct investment of mul tinational corporati on (M Cs). He traces th e ri se and role of MNCs. how they vary widely by sector in th eir degree of globali sation, and th e politi ca l power they exert in the face or nati onal governm ents and intergovernm ental organi sati ons. In doin g so. he ('IIn/rihllli!JI1S IIml ( ·/IlII1t'I7, 1!.CS 15 takes is ue w ith those who e mphas ise the de tabi li ing impact o r vo latile ho rt-term financial tl ows in a world of g lo ba li sed "cas ino capitalism" .
Rather, Rugman argues. th e proces of internati onal integrati o n is driven by the stable, fo reign direct investm ents o f M Cs. w h ich engage overwhe lmingly in a regionali sm based o n the rich triad count ri es or th e US . Europe, and Japan , rather than any comprehens ive g lo bali sm. For both triadbased MNCs in their production a nd marketing. and fo r governm ents in their e fforts to support and regulate the process by creating internati onal trade and investment regimes. it is the home region rathe r than the wider wor ld that is primary. The collapse of Asian economic growth in 1997 and th e contagious worldwide economic s lowdown and contagion of 1998-99 was a result in part of the failure of Asian-based firm s and governments to deve lo p. through th e A ia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) or oth erwi se, as stro ng and successful a regional strategy and reg ime as th ose o r th e ir North American and European counterparts with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). Fu rth er. th e crisis 0.1' 1997-99 has driven a ll to turn even more away from g loba l strategy to th e relative safety of their regional bastion s.
Agreement on Fundamental Issues
Am idst the wea lth of ins ight and analysis th at these chapters conta i n. th ere are underl y ing agreements o n man y fund amental issues. Above all. the contributors critica ll y assess and challenge man y core e le ments of th e e merging consensus in po li cy and outside inte ll ectual ci rc les about the new ystem c urrently being constructed . Avo idin g any te mptation to ce le brate the accomplish ments of the G7 guided effort thus far. they o ffe r at best a cautious confidence that much of the crisis respo nse and syste m construction e ffo rt is proceeding with competence and often in th e correct directi o n. They sec. however. that there is no ground for co mplace ncy o r inacti o n.
In "'Challenges and Contributions to the Conve ntional Wi sdom". th e linal chapter of this text' , Kai ser, Kirton , and Dani'e ls summari se th e v iews of the va riou s contributors by issue area . On th e ti ve fundamental questi o ns at th e heart of the inte llectual debate and po licy effo rt. the contributors offer :In array of views, but also a large measure of :lgreement on what W:l S. is be in g. and sho uld be done . Taken together. th e e make a 'ubstantial contributi o n to o ur understanding o f the debate over the international financial system thc world needs to cope wit h in the twe nty-tirst century.
